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1. The movement known as analytical sociology (AS) has for years represented the most 
interesting challenge in the attempt to construct a so-called middle-range sociology such 
as that developed by Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Robert K. Merton at Columbia University in 
the 1940’s and 1950’s1. Analytical sociology. Actions and Networks edited by Gianluca Manzo 
constitutes an interpretation of the identity of AS that is equally interesting. The aim that 
Manzo states in his introduction to this volume is a bold and ambitious one: to provide 
not only a better, clearer and more exhaustive list of the principles upon which the 
cognitive task of AS is based, but, above all, to give also a metatheoretical framework and 
a research program. This is of course my interpretation. The author keeps a low proile, 
presenting his position simply as a proposal for “a speciic understanding of analytical 
sociology” which means neither “to speak for analytical sociology” nor to “polish and 
police its present boundaries”, and the collected contributions as “a suite of variations on 
a common theme” (p.xiii). Rather than what AS currently represents, the focus is shifted 
on what AS could become (or wish to become) in the future. Such openness to the future 
is certainly the most interesting aspect of the author’s entire proposal for an interpreta-
tion of AS, and is supported by a fruitful and promising exchange with “other theoretical 
and methodological approaches” (ibid.). As the author knows all too well, there is a double 
challenge in two realms: within AS itself, as it will imply a revision of theoretical and 
methodological principles that seemed well established; and in the exchange with other 
approaches, which might resist innovation or simply wish to defend and preserve their 
cognitive identity. This is, then, both a cognitive and social challenge, which concerns 
1 The expression “analytical sociology”, introduced by Peter Hedström in Dissecting the Social. On 
the Principles of Analytical Sociology (2005), has entered the contemporary sociological lexicon. 
Its epistemological, theoretical, and methodological features were presented in Manzo (2010), 
in Hedström and Bearman (2009b), and in the essays collected by Hedström and Bearman 
(2009a) as well as by Demeulenaere (2011). One can read a seminal collection of essays in 
Hedström and Swedberg (1998). Both conceptual clariications and the main criticisms are 
presented in Manzo’s introductory chapter. 
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the contents of knowledge, the concrete way in which groups of researchers look at the 
research process, as well as the political and social relations between the researchers 
themselves. It is not only a set of principles and a research program as conceived by Imre 
Lakatos (I shall return to this point later), but also a proposal for a division of labor: the 
“accomplishment of this research program depends on a clear division of labor among 
quantitative and qualitative scholars, formal modelers, and experimentalists” (p.3). In 
order to achieve this, it is necessary that the “common theme” be clearly expressed.
2. I will then begin with the common theme: a speciic interpretation of AS, which, 
irst of all, requires an account of the route made since Peter Hedström’s Dissecting the 
Social (2005), the movement’s manifesto. As the author stresses, Hedström conceives AS 
as something which holds together a set of principles (on explanation, on the micro-
foundation of social phenomena, on the action theory, on interaction and interdepen-
dence processes, on the micro-macro transition, on the role of statistical methods and 
formal models for the empirical control of sociological theories), whose interdepen-
dence constitutes its most distinctive aspect in the scenario of today’s sociology. It is 
this interdependence that produces a compound, in the chemical sense of the word, 
meaning a new intellectual substance—an emergent characteristic, as the analytical 
sociologists themselves would say. Manzo’s work begins exactly from here, assuming 
this point as irreducible. But this is a starting point, not a conclusion, which “points 
to (one of) its possible future(s)” (p.3) without excluding any. However, starting from 
Dissecting the Social does not mean ignoring neither the collection of critical contributions 
and fruitful discussions that this book has produced, nor the diversity of theoretical 
and/or methodological options that many authors that can be counted among analyti-
cal sociologists have expressed with respect to the contents of some of the constitutive 
principles. Just to give one example: what characteristics should the logic of action have 
if the aim is to develop a generative model? Should it be calculation-based or ordinary-
based or cognitive-based or ecological-based? As we will see, these are not mutually 
exclusive alternatives, but a possible continuum (see also Manzo, 2012). We can then 
identify at least two aspects that the author will embrace in his interpretation of AS. 
The irst is the heterogeneity of the theoretical and methodological positions, which are 
postulated as a value; the second is the attention to some of the critiques, conceived as 
guidelines to improve or extend the cognitive scope of the principles. Apart from the 
historical and conceptual misunderstandings of AS, taking the critiques put forward 
by many commentators seriously implies evaluating them cognitively one by one, and, 
in a way, codifying them. Thus, the openness to a (potential) cognitive conlict and 
especially to diferent styles of sociological work represents the reverse of any form of 
imperialism, which often operates in intellectual projects. Since the conlict between 
diferent styles of sociological work is mostly social in nature, as Merton pointed out 
in his studies in the sociology of knowledge (1973, esp. Chapter 3), a signiicant part 
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of these critiques have particularly insisted on the lack of originality of AS, presenting 
it as a mere variation of theoretical and/or methodological options from the past. The 
interpretation that Manzo gives of AS corrects these misconceptions and gives value to 
the content of those critiques that allow for fruitful progress.
3. However, it is necessary to make one point clear. Although the author is aware of past 
debates and appreciates their most constructive and promising aspects, he proposes an 
interpretation of AS that wants to turn the page and start again. The challenge is to leave 
behind the epistemological and/or ontological discussions on the diferent interpreta-
tions of the concept of mechanism, of mechanism-based explanations, of action theory 
and of methodological individualism, in order to deal with each of these aspects in the 
actual research process. The most distinctive aspect of AS is the virtuous and progressive 
relation between theoretical elements and methodological instruments, knowing that the 
natural environment to develop this relation is the ield of empirical research. The prin-
ciples discussed by the author, then, represent “a set of research guidelines for both theo-
retical model building and empirical model testing in sociology” (p.7). The uniqueness 
of AS in the current sociological scenario consists precisely in the combination of these 
principles, and in the fact that they are put into work in parallel and jointly. The principles 
are seven, and are presented by Manzo in a sequence from P1 to P7: use clear and precise 
concepts, avoiding any linguistic obscurity (P1); describe facts using empirical informa-
tion and suitable technical tools (P2); formulate a generative model to explain the social 
outcome described (P3); provide a description of the micro-level entities (P4a) and acti-
vities (P4b) at work, and of the structural interdependencies (P4c) in which they operate; 
translate the generative model into an agent-based computational model (P5); compare 
the computational model’s outcomes with the empirical description of facts (P6); inject 
empirical experimental data into the agent-based computational model (P7). Although 
the discussion of each of the principles cannot be carried out individually and separately 
from the general discussion, the analysis of principles P3 (generative models), P4b (logics 
of action), P4c (structural interdependency) and P5 (agent-based modeling) is particu-
larly interesting. These speciic principles represent especially accurate codiications of 
theoretical achievements and empirical research results that can serve as a starting point. 
In a sense, these principles constitute the hard core of Manzo’s proposal. Let us consider 
generative models (P3). These concern the problem of a mechanism-based explanation, 
but this explanation is not based on the mechanisms themselves, but rather on models 
of mechanisms. While the irst are elements from the social world, the latter are theo-
retical constructs that hypothesize the functioning of the mechanism itself (p.17). Thus, 
according to AS explaining a social phenomenon means constructing a model that is 
capable of hypothesizing its generation, and thus testing it empirically. Since social agents 
are parts of the generative model, it is necessary to construct a map to codify the main 
prospectives relating to the rationality of action (P4b), which are placed on a continuum 
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“whose extremes are the calculation-based rationality […] and the ‘ecological’ rationality 
of the ‘fast-and-frugal heuristic’ research program” (p.22). 
The distinctive criterion, however, is realism, meaning how much each of these pers-
pectives converges, diverges or corresponds to the research results. Depending on the 
cognitive objectives, on the status of our theoretical knowledge and on the empirical 
results available, it can be reasonable to use a simple agent, as long as the types of reasons 
that can be employed in diferent situations are clearly identiied, and cannot be iden-
tiied a priori once and for all. Codifying the spectrum of reasons that realistically orient 
agents’ actions opens up new perspectives for research, focusing on the aspects that can 
be further investigated both at the theoretical and empirical levels. This is the way to 
construct integrated models of behaviors that combine diferent mechanisms coming 
from diferent research traditions. These include perspectives developed within social 
and cognitive psychology, perspectives developed within cultural sociology, guidelines 
emerging from lab experiments on the relective manner in which agents make deci-
sions and solve complex problems “by creating cognitive shortcuts that prove useful in a 
given choice setting” (p.26). The latter, can be both slow, efortful, conscious processes, 
and fast, automatic, unconscious, and are selected depending on the type of scripts, 
rituals and codes that characterize the situational logic in which the action takes place.
Since agents’ action takes shape within structural interdependences (P4c)—i.e. it is 
simultaneously bound and made possible by the interrelation between institutional, 
cultural and contextual elements on the one hand, and genuinely relational elements 
on the other hand—it is necessary that the generative model includes hypotheses on 
the nature and the characteristics of the structural interdependences, in which the 
micro-level entities could be embedded. Thus, if individual desires and beliefs repre-
sent motives for action, local interactions, membership to speciic social networks 
and the structural position occupied by the agent represent the means through which 
value- and/or culture-oriented behavior patterns are selected and concretely expressed. 
It appears clear, then, why actions and networks represent the two pillars of AS, and 
all contributions in the book consist in in-depth explorations of P4 in general, carried 
out through exemplary and creative research experiences. However, the central prin-
ciple of the entire AS strategy in Manzo’s interpretation is P5. Since it aims to check 
the connection between models of mechanisms and observed macro phenomena, this 
principle proposes the transformation of the generative model into a formal one of a 
computational type. Agent-based models represent the preferred methodological tool (at 
least for Manzo2) due to a sort of structural homology between the characteristics of the 
2 Manzo (2014a) is also the editor of a monographic issue published by the Revue française de so-
ciologie. In his introduction, he analyzes the main features of agent-based models, that make them 
useful for sociologists, particularly for the construction of mechanisms-based explanations, the 
transition micro-macro, and the relationship with empirical available data (see Manzo, 2014b). 
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mechanisms in question (entities, properties, activities, interactions) and the charac-
teristics of the computer basis of multi-agent systems (objects, attributes, functions, 
communication). Like mechanisms (the basic units of generative models), objects (the 
basic units of a multi-agent system) are conceptually empty, lexible, generative (their 
dynamic dimension allows, through algorithmic causality, to put to work the require-
ment of generativity that is so typical of mechanism-based explanations). Objects allow 
to determine the possible macroscopic consequences of hypothetical mechanisms, thus 
enabling new and promising perspectives concerning the micro-macro transition. They 
are powerful tools capable of combining simplicity and realism, theoretical imagina-
tion and rigorous empirical check, comparison between simulated and empirical data, 
and indirect (using qualitative observation) and direct (using quantitative information) 
empirical calibration. Essentially, multi-agent models represent a methodological tool to 
combine theoretical relection and empirical data produced in diferent research areas 
(from lab and experimental studies to survey data and longitudinal or historical data) 
and quantitative and qualitative methods. 
In addition to the chapters by Manzo and by Hedström and Ylikoski—the irst more 
generic and ambitious, the latter more focused on the theoretical and methodological 
diferences between AS and Rational Choice Theory, both representing a genuine syste-
matization of the AS research program3—the other 14 contributions in the book consist 
in variations on the common theme as well as proposals for theoretical and methodo-
logical integrations and/or explorations of new research problems. Within the logic of 
a research program, they represent exemplary cases of theoretically and empirically 
progressive problemshift, in Lakatos’ sense. But unlike Lakatos’ work, there is no priority 
for discovery or theoretical invention over empirical justiication—which, in Lakatos’ 
terms, can occur even a lng time after the formulation of a theoretical idea. Instead, 
theoretical and empirical progressiveness are postulated as serving as each other’s basis, 
in a continuative, circular and mutually amplifying relation. In this sense, AS repre-
sents, also in Manzo’s understanding, a form of middle-range sociology as conceived by 
Merton (see, on this point, Hedström and Udéhn, 2009).
4. The above set of principles is not “a set of universal normative imperatives” but “a set of 
logically organized guesses as to the fruitfulness of a speciic list of theoretical and metho-
dological options […] within a given pieces of research” (p.9). In this sense, it is reminis-
cent of Lakatos’ research program (1978). On the one hand, however, the methodology 
put forward by Lakatos’ research programs was the result of a historical sequence of philo-
sophies of science that were considered inadequate compared to the process of scientiic 
knowledge—Justiicationism, Neojustiicationism (i.e. Probabilism), Conventionalism, 
Dogmatic falsiicationism. It represented a sophisticated and methodologically sensible 
3 See also, on this point, Hedström and Ylikoski (2010).
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version of falsiicationism (Lakatos, in fact, named it Methodological falsiicationism), 
which maintained nonetheless a universal and normative aspect. On the other hand, the 
set of principles that characterize AS is not conceived as a priori methodological rules, 
from which to derive concrete research operations, but as idealized characterizations that 
originate in the research process itself, and that are founded on existing theoretical ideas 
and empirical studies. Unlike Lakatos’ research program, on the epistemological level this 
represents a naturalistic version of the knowledge process (relating to the actual theory-
oriented empirical research), rather than a rationalistic one. The reference to Lakatos’ 
research program must thus be interpreted in a metaphorical (and perhaps intuitive) 
sense, as a way to deal with a speciic substantive problem through an appropriate combi-
nation of theoretical ideas and research results. In a more abstract manner, it can also 
be interpreted as a sequence of developing theories, characterized a) by their hard core 
(negative heuristic), a set of principles that must never be questioned and that the scien-
tist must protect from the modus tollens (i.e. the attempt to confute them) by “inventing” 
auxiliary hypotheses, which constitute a sort of protective belt around the hard core, 
toward which the modus tollens is moved; and b) by an agenda that sets out the substantive 
problems on which to focus and work (positive heuristic). In this last sense, the choice of 
anomalies and/or puzzles to be faced and solved is never random (Lakatos explicitly and 
polemically refers to Thomas Kuhn’s concept of normal science), to the extent that it is 
possible to efectively think of a hierarchy of problems. Although used in a metaphorical 
sense, then, the reference to Lakatos’ research program has the purpose of establishing a 
double function for the set of principles: they represent both the negative heuristic (the 
“hard core” of the program of AS) and the guidelines for an agenda of concrete problems 
(both theoretical and empirical) in a hierarchical order (the positive heuristic).
5. There is one last point, which I have already touched upon: the ambition of the 
project put forward in the book. Is this ambition excessive, as the author rhetorically 
asks in the inal chapter? His answer, of course, is that it is not, and I fully agree with 
him. If the map presented by Manzo is convincing (and I believe it is), it represents 
a proposal for a transition to a new phase, not only for AS but also for “The Rest of 
Sociology”4. A research program, in the same way as the activity of normal science in 
Kuhn’s sense, is possible only if it begins with a maturation of the ield. Analytical Sociology. 
Actions and Networks proves that this is the case. But the epistemological relection on the 
“process” of science has highlighted a close relation between general stances (world 
4 The expression “The Rest of Sociology” was used by Daniel Little (2012) to question the idea 
that AS represents the best research strategy for sociology. Instead, he supports a plurality and 
variety of research approaches for sociology, equally legitimate, and irreducibles to AS research 
program (on this point see also Bearman, 2012 and Santoro, 2012). With reference to “The 
Rest of Sociology”, for Lizardo (2012) AS research program lacks innovation and empirical 
progress, and represents a superluous revolution.
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visions, conceptual frameworks, paradigms, research programs, reasoning styles and so 
on), the construction of theories, their transformation into methodological tools for data 
collection and analysis, and empirical research. Even a supericial glance at contempo-
rary epistemology reveals not only the inevitability of these relations, but also that the 
social sciences, and most of all sociology, represent a privileged point of view on the 
concrete ways in which metatheoretical options function as a guide for theories and 
dynamic processes in research. Social sciences and sociology are indeed characterized 
not only by theoretical pluralism but also, and perhaps especially, by metatheoretical 
pluralism. Following Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970 [1969]), the pre-para-
digmatic state of sociology has given birth to school of thoughts, with few channels of 
communication and even fewer conceptual and research interconnections. However, 
as Merton noted, the Kuhnian option of a dynamic process that has its inal point in 
paradigmatic monism (1976, p.131) fails to detect the true status of sociology—and, 
in this respect, the reference at Lakatos’ research program is convincing. Instead, a 
plurality of paradigms and of research programs might succeed in satisfying diferent 
functions in the evolution of a discipline. Merton identiies at least two of these func-
tions: the irst concerns the selection and conceptualization of a great variety of research 
problems; the second suggests that paradigms direct researchers to diferent types of 
phenomena that can be best used to analyze each succession of problems. If each of 
these paradigms/research programs is intellectually disciplined, pluralism and diversity 
will be instrumental to explore the diferent aspects of human actions and society, that 
a single paradigm might overlook. If the constellation of paradigms/research programs 
that has historically characterized sociology throughout its evolution has not represented 
a hindrance to the accumulation of sociological knowledge, it has however shifted the 
competition between paradigms from the cognitive to the social ground. Sociological 
paradigms/research programs, in the same way as scientiic ones, are inextricable links 
of cognitive interests and networks of social relations, and the balance between the two 
levels is always precarious and never fully realized. Therefore, as Merton himself repea-
tedly demonstrated in his analyses of science, the competition between exponents of 
diferent paradigms/research programs has often concerned the allocation of resources 
or the recruitment of new generations of researches rather than cognitive confrontation.
But, as it has already been noted, the diversity of sociological styles, even those which share 
the metatheoretical idea that macro phenomena are the product of aggregated individual 
actions, tend to prioritize social over cognitive competition. If the ambition, then, is for AS 
to count as scientiic innovation, the social characteristics of innovation processes cannot 
be neglected. If theoretical and empirical progressiveness in the AS research program will 
only be established in the near future, it will not be possible to separate it from the way 
in which this proposal for innovation will imply a relative advantage (i.e. if it is socially 
perceived as better than the meta-ideas it aims to replace), and if it will be compatible 
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with the existing values and research practices in ample sectors of the discipline. All of 
the necessary conditions are already in place, but will they be enough? Will the plurality 
of meta-theoretical and theoretical approaches remain in the form of “disciplined eclec-
ticism”, as suggested many years ago by Merton (1976, p.142), or will they evolve into a 
reasoned research program? If this happens, we will be able to think of a new founding 
pact for Good Sociology—a founding pact that includes AS and “The Rest of Sociology”.
AN. This article is supported by the Grant Agency of Czech Republic, 
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